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Abstract. This essay explores the role of melancholy within the consolatory 
literature  of Renaissance  humanism. It  begins (sections  I-II)  with  a  summary  of  the 
themes and methods of humanist consolationes and their classical models, with particular 
attention to their moral psychology, and addresses their relationship with scripture and 
Christian spiritual literature. It then turns to the position of melancholy within humanist 
consolations  (sections  III-VI).  It  is  shown  that  whilst  in  many  cases  moralists  and 
spiritual  writers  were reluctant  invade  the  territory  of  the  physicians  by  analysing  or 
treating a fundamentally somatic condition, discussions of the accidentia animi in Galenic 
medicine  provided  the  conceptual  environment  within  which  a  moral-consolatory 
therapy  for  melancholy  could  be  formulated  and  applied.  Here  the  role  of  the 
imagination was crucial: as the primarily affected part in the disease, it was the faculty of 
the soul that was primarily responsible for melancholic passions, but also the faculty that 
presented the physician and moralist with the opportunity to dispel or alleviate those 
passions. Hence, the imagination was at the centre of a moral psychology of melancholy. 
The  final  sections  of  the  essay  (V-VI)  show  that  the  fullest  implementation  of  this 
approach  to  the  treatment  of  melancholy  was  in  Robert  Burton’s  ‘Consolatory 
Digression’ in The Anatomy of Melancholy (1621), which both synthesises the various moral, 
spiritual and psychological elements of the humanist consolatory tradition, and contains a 
number of idiosyncratic and paradoxical features. 
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Introduction 
  In 1621, the English humanist Robert Burton claimed that the best way of treating the 
disease of melancholy was to address the sufferer’s mental perturbations. ‘Whosoever, he is’, 
Burton wrote in The Anatomy of Melancholy, ‘that shall hope to cure this malady in himselfe, or any 
other, must first rectifie these passions and perturbations of the minde, the chiefest cure consists 
in them.’1 This was the view, according to Burton, of such learned physicians as Jean Fernel, 
Girolamo Mercuriale, Girolamo Capo di Vacca, Leonardo Giachini, Franz Hildesheim, Gualter 
Bruel, Johannes Crato von Crafftheim, and Filoteu Eliau Montalto, all of whom ‘inculcate this an 
especiall meanes of their cure, that their mindes be quietly pacified, vaine conceits diverted, if it be possible, 
[from] terrors, cares, fixed studies, cogitations, and whatsoever it is that shall any way molest or trouble the Soule, 
because that otherwise there is no good be done.’2 Afflictions of the mind were therefore ‘the 
fountaine, the subject, the hinges whereon [melancholy] turnes’, and the key to the restoration of 
health.  Perhaps most  importantly  though, this  was  also  the  opinion  of  Galen,  ‘the  common 
master of them all’, who, as Burton noted, ‘brags’ in the De sanitate tuenda (I.8) ‘that he for his part 
hath cured diverse of this infirmity, solum animis ad rectum institutis, by right setling alone of their 
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mindes.’3  For  this  reason,  the  Anatomy  included  a  lengthy  ‘Consolatory  Digression’  for 
melancholy, designed to effect ‘the cure of a discontented and troubled minde’.4 
  As Burton’s citations of contemporary and ancient medical authors indicate, his claim 
that melancholy could be treated by means of working on the passions was not innovative. Yet if 
we  search  for  precedents  for  his  application  of  philosophical  consolation  to  melancholy  we 
discover only a puzzlingly small number of works. It is well known that one of the classical 
projects revived by humanist in the Renaissance was to turn philosophy to the practical ethical 
purpose of healing the perturbations of the soul.5 This was the conception of philosophy as 
medicina animi, conceived most influentially for humanists by Cicero in the Tusculanae disputationes,6 
but realised in the most concrete literary form in the consolatio, an enterprise concerned with the 
alleviation and dispersal of the psychological pains experienced by individuals. We have also often 
been told that the Renaissance was the ‘golden age’ of melancholy, a condition thought to have 
many forms, but typically characterised by chronic sadness, fear, and anxiety, and a pressing 
concern for many medical writers from the mid-fifteenth century onwards.7 On the face of it at 
least, it is therefore surprising that humanist consolations only seldom mention the condition. In 
fact, Burton’s ‘Consolatory Digression’ is perhaps the only truly substantial example (and a very 
late one at that) of a European humanist consolatio designed specifically for melancholy.  
Here  I  shall  be  exploring  the  role  of  melancholy  within  the  humanist  consolatory 
tradition, and its somewhat perplexing rarity, with a view to illustrating the character of Burton’s 
moral therapy for melancholy and the intellectual background from which it emerged. I begin 
with brief summaries of the character of humanist consolationes and their classical models, outlining 
some  of  their  principal  themes  and  methods  and  their  moral-psychological  basis,  and  their 
relationship with scripture and Christian spiritual literature (sections I-II). I then turn to the 
position of melancholy within humanist consolations (sections III-VI). We shall see that whilst in 
many  cases  moralists  and  spiritual  writers  were  reluctant  to  direct  their  attention  to  a 
fundamentally  somatic  condition  that  was  typically  considered  to  be  the  province  of  the 
physician,  discussions  of  the  accidentia  animi  in  learned  medicine  provided  the  conceptual 
environment within which a moral-consolatory therapy for melancholy could be formulated and 
applied. Here the role of the imagination was crucial: as the primarily affected part in the disease, 
it was the faculty of the soul that was primarily responsible for melancholic passions, but also the 
faculty that presented the physician and moralist with the opportunity to dispel or alleviate those 
passions. In this way, the imagination was at the centre of a moral psychology of melancholy, 
which we see elaborated and implemented in its fullest form in Burton’s humanistic ‘Consolatory 
Digression.’ 
 
The Consolatory Tradition 
In  the  Renaissance,  humanist  works  of  consolation  were  produced  in  a  number  of 
different literary forms, in letters, speeches, dialogues, and instructive manuals. They were usually 
addressed in the first instance to the personal circumstances of friends or family members, but 
wider audiences were assumed in general consolatory manuals, and also in works directed at 
individuals, since although circumstantial particularities were always to be borne in mind the 
activity of giving comfort drew upon the basic principles governing human nature. Their aim was 
always specifically therapeutic: to alleviate and disperse the psychological pain experienced by 
individuals by means of philosophical wisdom and spiritual guidance, applied humanistically with 
the assistance of rhetorical eloquence and poetic expression.8 
The central therapeutic mechanism of the humanist consolatio derived from the classical 
moral doctrine, which had been elaborated in a number of well-known works such as Seneca’s De 
consolatione ad Marciam, Plutarch’s Consolatio ad Apollonium, and Boethius’ De consolatione philosophiae,  
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that disturbing passions are the product of a person’s false judgements about his or her external 
circumstances.9 Accordingly, the most important aspect of consolation involved the correction of 
such false judgements by philosophical argument, which alleviated or removed perturbations and 
restored  to  the  sufferer  a  properly  rational  attitude  to  the  world  that  was  based  upon  self-
knowledge.10 In Bartolomeo Scala’s Dialogus de consolatione (1463), for instance, the fundamental 
contention is that happiness depends not on external fortuna but upon the resources of the inner 
self. Once this is truly accepted, and self-knowledge is attained, Scala argues, tranquillity can be 
restored by following rational precepts—‘death is not to be feared’, and so on.11  
But although the conceptual foundations of humanistic consolations were usually taken 
from classical ethics, they were consistently supplemented with, or when appropriate modified by, 
spiritual  guidance  and  comforting  precepts  derived  from  scripture  or  Christian  doctrine. 
Typically, then, even if Hellenistic teachings about recta ratio and the opposition of virtue to fortuna 
were ubiquitous in these works, their authors commonly rejected the Stoic ideal of apathy and 
Epicurean  hedonism  in  favour  of  Christian  teachings  on  suffering,  virtue  and  compassion.12 
Humanist  consolationes  routinely  included  biblical  exempla  (most  commonly  that  of  Job),  and 
arguments clustering around the teaching of 1 Corinthians 13:12—life is a mere pale shadow of 
that which is to come. Scala ended his dialogue with Cosimo de’ Medici contrasting the suffering 
life ‘amid [the] shadow and smoke’ of this world with the ‘delights’ of ‘our heavenly country’.13 
  The simple delivery of philosophical and spiritual precepts was rarely considered by to be 
sufficient  in  itself,  however.  Instead,  it  was  a  commonplace  of  classical  and  humanistic 
consolations that for the full therapeutic potential of these precepts to be maximised, careful 
attention should be paid in the first place to the particular disposition and circumstances of the 
sufferer.  As  Francis  Bacon  wrote  in  his  discussion  of  the  cultura  animi  in  The  Advancement  of 
Learning  (1605),  the  philosophical  treatment  of  affections  required  ‘true  distributions  and 
descriptions of the several characters and tempers of men’s natures and dispositions’, since ‘the 
wisdom of application resteth principally in the exact and distinct knowledge of the precedent 
state or disposition unto which we do apply: for we cannot fit a garment, except we first take 
measure of the body.’14 The activity of consolation in particular needed to be sensitive to the 
character and circumstances of the sufferer. In The English Secretorie (1586), Angel Day suggested 
that when composing consolatory letters, it was ‘meet and convenient’ 
 
that in devising to yeeld this sweet gentle remedie to anie troubled conceite, 
we doe so moderate the matter, as that in the Discoverie thereof, we rather 
strike not to a farre greater impatience or extremitie of unmesurable sorrow 
than before, upon untimelie thrusting forward, or ignorant pursuit of the 
same, seeing that the mindes of some, are of so hie and incomprehensible 
stoutnesse …. Others againe so rise and abundant in teares, as the least shew 
of repetition in them, induceth matter enough of continuall mourning …15 
 
Care was also to be taken with regard to the manner in which philosophical and spiritual 
precepts, some of which could be harsh and difficult to digest, were communicated. As with their 
ancient counterparts, who gave priority to the practical exigencies of therapy over the logical 
distinctions and proofs of speculative discourse,16 humanists deemed literary devices—such as  
poetic  quotations,  vivid  exempla,  dialogic  depictions  of  sufferers  being  gradually  brought  to 
psychic  health,  and  the  persuasive  resources  of  rhetoric  in  general17—crucial  to  the  difficult 
enterprise of changing the states of mind, and most importantly the false beliefs, that were the 
source of disturbing passions. Remedies for grief, wrote Petrarch in his consolatory letter to 
Donato Apenninigena [1368] (Sen. X.4), could be found in ‘the gardens of all the philosophers  
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and poets’. Hence, alongside the elegant philosophical maxims of Cicero, Petrarch repeatedly 
quoted and referred to Virgil and Horace, and fleshed out his discourse with vivid classical and 
scriptural exempla of virtuous responses to psychological suffering.18  More than two hundred and 
fifty years later in 1621, Hugo Grotius did the same in a consolatory letter to his friend Aubéry 
Du Maurier, the French Ambassador to the Hague, fleshing out his philosophical and spiritual 
arguments with pithy quotations from various Greek poets, including Solon and Antiphanes.19 
According to Cardano in the De consolatione libri tres (1542), although it would sometimes be 
impossible fully to dispel mental suffering by reason alone, the activity of reading his literary 
historia malorum could itself help, on account of its pleasurable variety and examples. Wherever he 
could,  Cardano  incorporated  the  words  of  those  egregios  Poetas  from  antiquity  who  had 
experienced and depicted mourning.20 As Bacon observed, ‘the poets and writers of histories are 
the best doctors of this knowledge [of the affections]; where we may find painted forth with great 
life,  how  affections  are  kindled  and  incited;  and  how  pacified  and  refrained;  and  how  again 
contained from act and further degree…’.21 
By such literary-rhetorical means, consolatory philosophical discourse could be addressed 
not just to the rational faculty of understanding, but also the sensitive power of imagination. In 
classical rhetoric the linguistic construction of visions (imagines) was considered to be a powerful 
means of influencing the emotions, since they affected the imagination with particular immediacy 
and  power.22  The  emotive  power  of  visual  imagery  was  also  a  commonplace  of  humanist 
rhetoric,23 and although Renaissance writers tended not to offer detailed explanations, the general 
assumption was that it derived from the power of such images upon the imagination. Certainly 
this accorded with the famous psychological conception of rhetoric formulated by Bacon: the 
‘duty and office of rhetoric’ was ‘to apply Reason to Imagination for the better moving of the 
will.’ Rhetoric should be employed, Bacon explained, ‘to fill the imagination to second reason’, 
specifically by suppressing ‘the continual mutinies and seditions of the affections’, to ‘win the 
imagination  from  the  affections’  part,  and  contract  a  confederacy  between  the  reason  and 
imagination against the affections’ (VI.3).24  
Measures  directed  at  the  imagination  were  considered  to  affect  the  power  that  was 
responsible for the reception of sense-data and the composition of mental images, processes 
typically deemed to be integral to the production of emotions insofar as they intensified and 
amplified  those  images,  but  also  cognition  and  the  formation  of  belief.  In  scholastic  faculty 
psychology,  the  imagination  was  often  subdivided  into  the  powers  of  common  sense  (sensus 
communis)—which in Burton’s fairly representative summary discerns ‘all differences of objects’ 
that have been perceived by the external senses—imagination (virtus imaginativa) and phantasy 
(phantasia)—which according to the same author are one and the same, and which ‘some call 
Æstimative, or Cogitative … [and] doth more fully examine the Species perceaved by the common 
sense, of things present or absent, and keepes them longer, recalling them to mind againe, or 
making new of his owne’.25 In altering the character of such sense-species, or in creating new 
species, the imagination directly influenced the production of passions, since it was these species 
that were communicated by the spirits in the brain to the heart, the seat of the emotions. As 
Burton wrote, reproducing the explanation given by ‘[Thomas] Wright the Jesuite in his booke of 
the passions of the minde’, 
 
To our imagination commeth, by the outward sense or memory, some object 
to be knowne (residing in the foremost part of our braine) which he mis-
conceaving or amplifying, presently communicates to the Heart, the seat of all 
affections. The pure spirits forthwith flocke from the Braine to the Heart, by 
certain secret channels, and signifie what good or bad object was presented,  
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which  immediately  bends  it  selfe  to  prosecute,  or  avoid  it;  and  withall, 
draweth with it other humours to help it: so in pleasure, concurre great store 
of purer spirits; in sadnesse, much melancholy blood; in ire, choller.26 
 
Moreover, since it was axiomatic in scholastic psychology that nihil in intellectu quod non 
prius  in  sensu,27  as  the  power  mediating  the  passage  of  sense-species  through  the  soul  the 
imagination also influenced the activities of the understanding. Burton explained that the agent 
intellect ‘abstracts those intelligible Species from the Phantasie’, before transferring them to the 
passive intellect.28 Hence, as he wrote, ‘[s]ome ascribe all vices to a false & corrupt Imagination, 
Anger, Revenge, Lust, Ambition, Covetousness, which preferres falshood, before that which is 
right and good, deluding the Soule with false shewes and suppositions .… as he falsely imagineth, 
so he beleeveth, and as he conceaveth of it, so it must be, and it shall be, contra gentes, he will have 
it so.’29 For Bacon, similarly, ‘sense sends all kinds of images over to imagination for reason to 
judge of; and reason again when it has made its judgement and selection, sends them over to 
imagination before the decree be put in execution.’ Hence, the imagination was actively involved 
in processes of cognition and volition: ‘[F]or voluntary motion is ever preceded and incited by 
imagination; so that imagination is as a common instrument to both, – both reason and will.’ 
Rhetorical  eloquence,  by  which  ‘men’s  minds  are  soothed,  inflamed,  and  carried  hither  and 
thither’,  therefore  works  ‘by  stimulating  the  imagination’,  engaging  the  passions  but  also 
informing the reason and moving the will.30  
Here we can see that imagination could have two distinct but related roles in rhetoric and 
psychology; it could be harnessed, but it could also require correction. In the first place, as a 
power that intensified and augmented sense-images, it could be harnessed by rhetorical methods 
to supplement rational philosophical argument with emotional force. In the second, it was held to 
be responsible for the production of its own ‘new’ sense-species, influencing the formation of 
beliefs as well as generating passions, and was thereby held to be a frequent source of erroneous 
perceptions and judgements that were in need of rectification. Indeed, it was in relation to the 
latter role of this faculty that the term ‘imagination’ was often used to describe those perceptions 
and judgements themselves, and equated with ‘opinion’, ‘conceit’, or ‘cogitation’.31 At this point 
we  may  detect  the  influence  of  Stoic  notions  of  phantasiai—the  imaginative  ‘representations’ 
which can be true or false, and the proper management of which is an essential component of 
psychic health—which infiltrated Renaissance moral psychology principally through the study and 
adaptation of Epictetus.32  
Perhaps the most striking instance of consolatory moral therapy that was directed at the 
imagination as the source of opinion and false belief can be found in Cardano’s De consolatione libri 
tres.33  Establishing  the  primacy  of  the  health  of  the  ‘inner  man’  in  accordance  with  Platonic 
doctrine, here Cardano argued that ‘totus enim homo, animus est, is si doleat, homo male se habet’ (in 
Thomas Bedingfield’s English translation of 1573, ‘[a] man is nothinge but his mynde: if the 
mynde be discontented, that man is al[l] disquiet[ed]’).34 Within the mind, Cardano identified two 
faculties that were responsible for psychic well-being: cogitatio and imaginatio, both of which were 
sources of opinion, itself the essential determinant of happiness or misery, and both of which 
were hence susceptible to modification or persuasion.35 His striking conclusion was that in all 
cases ‘this onelye is necessarye to save thee from mysery, [that] thou perswade thy selfe thou art 
not  myserable.’36  The  consolatio  could  thereby  become  a  medium  in  which  the  humanistic 
conjunction of philosophy—correcting errors of understanding and imaginative conceit by means 
of  rational  argument—and  rhetoric—working  on  the  imagination  through  eloquence—was 
extolled as a truly effective means of managing the passions of the suffering individual. 
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Consolation and Spiritual Comfort 
The most significant differences between ancient consolationes and their medieval and early 
modern  counterparts  derived  from  the  teachings  of Christianity.  On the  one  hand,  in  many 
important  respects  the  goals  and  methods  of  pagan  and  Christian  consolation  were  broadly 
compatible. After all the early Christian tradition of cura animi was in large part a continuation and 
adaptation  of  the  classical  philosophical  cultura  animi,  and  the  image  of  Christ  as  a  spiritual 
physician was ubiquitous in early modern religious and moral writings.37 And we have seen that 
those Renaissance humanists who were committed to the reconciliation of classical and Christian 
doctrine wherever possible, routinely incorporated both within their consolatory discourses, and 
in many cases explicitly theorised their general compatibility. As Bacon expressed this position in 
The  Advancement  of  Learning:  ‘if  it  be  said  that  the  cure  of  men’s  minds  belongeth  to  sacred 
Divinity, it is most true: but yet Moral Philosophy may be preferred unto her as a wise servant 
and humble handmaid’, to whose discretion ‘many things are left’ to provide ‘(within due limits) 
many  sound  and  profitable  directions.’38  Just  as  humanist  consolations  of  a  predominantly 
classical character incorporated Christian themes, so spiritual works could be integrated with 
pagan concepts and methods—as seen in the Divinus orator, vel de rhetorica divina libri septem (1595) 
by the Italian theologian and philosopher Ludovico Carbone, which devotes two chapters to the 
consolatory rhetorical genus of preaching.39 
On  the  other  hand,  however,  some  meaningful  distinctions  can  be  made  between 
humanist consolations and religious works of spiritual comfort in this period. Even if both forms 
of literature had overlapping concerns and sometimes drew upon the same sources, each had 
distinctive  vocabularies  and  concepts.  Humanists  were  very  clearly  indebted  to  the  classical 
consolatory  tradition:  they were  not  only demonstrably  aware  that they  were  continuing this 
tradition, but also routinely imported arguments, techniques, concepts and terminology from 
authors  like  Cicero,  Seneca  and  Plutarch  without  significant  alteration.  Typically,  humanist 
consolations exhibited a sustained indebtedness to ancient pagan authors, even if they referred to 
Christian themes and sources and remained fundamentally in line with Christian theology. They 
adhered closely to the classical conception of moral philosophy as a practical therapy for the soul, 
and to the position that passions can be alleviated or dispelled by the application of rational 
principles.40 And they were addressed to conditions of psychological perturbation involving a 
variety  of  passions,  most  prominent  amongst  which  are  those  denoting  grief,  sorrow,  or 
anguish—denoted, in the Latin tradition, by terms such as tristitia, dolor, moestitia, and aegritudo 
animi.41 
The Christianisation of the consolatory tradition in the hands of St Paul, Augustine, and 
other  patristic  writers,  however,  involved  the  preservation  of  some  aspects  of  the  classical 
consolatio  but  also  the  introduction  of  new  themes—in  addition  to  those  noted  above,  these 
included the distinction between tristitia secundum Deum (godly sorrow for sin) and tristitia saeculi 
(worldly grief).42 Perhaps most importantly, though, Christian writers fundamentally transformed 
the conception of suffering to which the consolation was to be addressed. In contrast to their 
classical predecessors, for these authors human misery was typically portrayed as an inevitable 
accompaniment of earthly existence after the Fall. It was the consequence not of capricious 
fortuna, but of a divine providence that imposed tribulation upon us as an ultimately beneficial test 
of our piety and spiritual endurance—a conception completely alien to the classical tradition—
and that ultimately bestowed a redemptive power upon our suffering. From this perspective, the 
strictly rational precepts and ethical maxims of pagan consolatory works were at best merely 
temporary fixes, at worst arrogant deceptions, and were to be supplemented with, or in many 
cases  replaced  by,  explanations  of  God’s  providence  and  hopeful  visions  of  heavenly 
tranquillity.43   
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Works of spiritual comfort, then, tended to minimise, ignore, or even attack the utility of 
any pagan wisdom that was independent of Christian dogma or authority. They downplayed or 
criticised the idea that passions could be managed by rational self-discipline, advocating instead 
the sufferer’s embracing of their redemptive spiritual trial. As Thomas More wrote in A Dialogue 
of Comfort (1534), although the ancient philosophers had ‘laboured  … very much about’ the 
alleviation of mental pain, and acknowledged that ‘some good drugs have they yet in their shops, 
for which they may be suffered to dwel among our Apothecaries’, nevertheless these should be 
administered only the pilles made by the great Physition God, prescribing the medicines himself, 
& correcting the faultes of their erroneous receipts.’ The ‘naturall reasons’ found in pagan works 
were from this spiritual perspective ‘very far unsufficient’. They ‘leave untouched, for lacke of 
necessary knowlege, that special point, which is not only the chief cumfort of al: but, without 
which also, al other cumforts are nothing’, namely ‘the referring of the final end of theyr cumfort 
unto God, & to repente & take for the special cause of cumfort, that by the pacient sufference of 
theyr tribulation, they shal attaine his favour, and for theyr paine receive reward at his hand in 
heaven.’44 Perhaps, though, the most striking illustration of the recognisable difference between 
humanistic consolations and spiritual works of comfort can be found in Burton’s Anatomy, which 
included  not  just  a  ‘Consolatory  Digression’  modelled  on  classical  exemplars  and  largely 
comprised of pagan philosophical arguments, but also, from the second edition onwards at the 
end of the book, a separate collection of ‘comfortable speeches, exhortations, arguments’ and 
‘advise’ drawn mainly from spiritual and theological works for those suffering from the form of 
despair that he termed ‘Religious Melancholy in Defect’.45 
Practical divinity became increasingly diverse and sophisticated after the Reformation, 
and it is well beyond the scope of this essay to summarise this complex territory. However, some 
number of significant trends should be noted. In the first place, divines, Catholic and Protestant 
alike, began to develop and advocate a variety of techniques, ocassionally of great psychological 
and epistemological subtlety, orientated towards the spiritual self-scrutiny and self-knowledge that 
was deemed necessary to spiritual healing. Here it perhaps suffices to mention a few of the many 
sixteenth and early seventeenth-century authors who concerned themselves with the practical and 
theoretical  issues  involved  in  administering  the  cura  animarum:  Ignatius  of  Loyola,  the  Italian 
Franciscan  Lorenzo  Scupoli,  the  Danish  Lutheran  Niels  Hemmingsen,  and  various  English 
Calvinists such  as  William Perkins,  Robert  Bolton,  Richard  Greenham,  John  Abernethy,  and 
Richard Baxter.46 We can also note an increasing preoccupation in practical divinity with cases of 
despair, broadly in accordance with the Pauline conception of tristitia, but denoted within the 
Lutheran  tradition  as  Anfechtung  and  theorised  by  Calvinists  as  the  affliction  of  conscience. 
Typically, such cases were addressed within soteriological narratives of temptation, sinfulness and 
redemption.47 
 
Melancholy in the Consolatory Tradition  
In his guidance for the composition of consolatory letters, Erasmus stated that ‘although 
consolation is reserved above all for cases of bereavement and exile, one may devise other themes 
on diverse matters that bring distress’, giving such examples as old age, ‘an ill-omened marriage’, 
but also ‘bodily disease’ and  ‘poor or uncertain health.’48 Thomas Wilson also emphasised the 
variety of circumstances in which consolation could be delivered in The Art of Rhetoric (1550), 
noting that it was useful ‘as well in private troubles, as in commune miseries’, such as ‘losse of 
gooddes, in lacke of frendes, in sicknes, in darthe, & in death’.49 If bodily as well as psychic 
disease  was  deemed  a  suitable  object  for  consolatory  discourse,  then,  the  rarity  with  which 
melancholy  was  discussed  in  humanist  consolationes,  noted  at  the  beginning  of  this  essay,  is 
surprising. How can this apparent anomaly be explained?  
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   Petrarch, whose concern with sorrow, solitude and introspection is well known, and 
whose extremely influential output included a considerable number of consolatory letters as well 
as the famous psychotherapeutic treatise De remediis utriusque fortunae (1344–66),50 never discussed 
melancholy in detail or specified it as an object for consolation. Instead, his explicit concern was 
with the predominantly mental, psychic, and spiritual states of dolor, aegritudo animi, and accidia.51  
In fact, there is no evidence to suggest that Petrarch had anything more than a passing interest in 
melancholia. The term appears only once in the De remediis, where in the discussion ‘De Scriptorum 
Fama’  he  remarked  briefly  on  the  innumerable  species  of  the  condition  and  its  occasional 
connection with literary activity.52 It also figures briefly in Epistolae familiares XX.lxiv, which relates 
and  supports  Cicero’s  mildly  sceptical  comments  about  the  pseudo-Aristotelian  doctrine  of 
melancholic genius.53  
Why  did  Petrarch  not  have  more  to say  about melancholy?  Partly,  I  would suggest, 
because of the relatively undeveloped state of ethical discourse about the condition in the late 
Middle Ages and early Renaissance, when it was usually considered to fall almost exclusively 
within the province of learned medicine. Petrarch would also, I think, have deemed any moral or 
spiritual consideration of the subject in terms set by physicians as likely to result in unacceptable 
concessions to what he saw as their crudely physical concerns.54 However, there is a more specific 
reason for his apparent lack of interest in melancholy. This is surely that his moral writing is 
infused with Roman Stoicism, which had followed Cicero’s analysis of aegritudo in the Tusculanae 
disputationes.55  Here  Cicero  expelled  the  concept  of  melancholy  from  the  domain  of  ethical 
discourse, on the grounds that it carried the troubling implication that mental tranquillity could 
always  be  disturbed  by  corporeal  imbalance.56  This  broadly  accorded  with  the  generic 
conventions of the consolatio, where in practice the passions addressed were typically (though not 
absolutely exclusively) those that arose initially from external events, rather than from internal 
complexions or diseases. 
In this light, it is not so surprising to find that on the rare occasions in the Renaissance 
when Stoically inclined consolatory writers did address melancholy explicitly, it was in a manner 
that rigorously submitted medical discourse to moral imperatives. Typically, they would present 
no more than a few commonplace remarks concerning the role of the melancholic humour in 
generating sorrow, and eschew discussion of the detailed psycho-physiology that formed the core 
of the Galenic account of the disease. This can be illustrated by perusing the consolatory letter 
written  in  1378  by  Coluccio  Salutati  to  his  melancholic  friend,  the  chancellor  of  Bologna  
Giuliano Zonarini.57 Although Salutati opened with a brief allusion to the Galenic understanding 
of the variability of the melancholic complexion (as it is subject to the influence of the other 
humours),58  his  consolatory  argument  otherwise  downplayed  the  account  of  the  two-way 
relationship between bodily and psychic disease given in medical accounts of the condition. That 
relationship, in fact, was effectively obliterated in Salutati’s letter, which subordinated the mortal 
body to the immortal soul, and sternly exhorted his melancholic friend to maintain his tranquillity 
and cultivate a Christian-Stoic ideal of wisdom. The melanconia referred to in this consolation was 
not a disease with a variety of interlinked psychic and somatic causes, symptoms and therapies (as 
in  Galenic  tradition),  but  a  discrete  mental  perturbation  with  a  bodily  origin  (in  this  sense, 
formally identical to erotic lust) that was to be conquered by the strict observance of stock ethical 
precepts. ‘Submit the flesh to the mind’, Salutati wrote, ‘and subject the appetite to reason.’59 The 
concept of melancholy could be incorporated within this form of consolatory discourse only by 
stripping it of its distinctively medical content.  
  However, the role of Stoicism in excluding or de-medicalising the concept of melancholy 
should not be overemphasised. Those who were fiercely critical of the Stoic analysis of passions, 
like Scala in his Dialogus de consolatione, also did not discuss melancholia, or indeed any of the physical  
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aspects of mental pain found in contemporary medical literature. Instead, Scala stayed squarely 
within  the  domain  of  ethical  discourse,  emphasising  that  ‘I  want  it  understood  that  I  mean 
‘anguish’ [aegritudo] in this discourse for the sake of consistency’.60 In the following century, the 
polymathic  physician  Girolamo  Cardano—who  addressed  the  psychology  of  melancholy 
extensively in a number of works— did not see fit to mention the condition in his De consolatione 
libri tres (1542) at all. This held even when he discussed the mental delusion of imagining oneself 
to be made of glass, a stock example in contemporary discussions of melancholy.61 Here, in the 
context of a strictly moral therapy, Cardano eschewed medical detail to point out simply that the 
glass delusion simply illustrated the potential power of mind over body.62 
  It seems likely that authors of consolations addressed melancholy only rarely because of a 
tacitly understood disciplinary division of labour. For their part, with some notable exceptions,63 
learned  physicians  were  generally  reluctant  to  discuss  the  moral  and  spiritual  aspects  of 
melancholy. Since this was a disease that was almost always traced to the influence of black bile, 
they were thereby adhering to the Hippocratic principle that diseases with material and natural 
causes were to be treated with material and natural remedies.64 But such an approach also reflects 
the materialist tendencies of those Galenists who espoused strongly logical notions of disease and 
therapeutics, and expressed a corresponding hostility to rhetoric. In the words of the Danish 
physician Caspar Bartholin (alluding to Celsus’s De medicina and echoing Petrarch’s complaint in 
Sen. III. 8 about the futile verbiage of doctors), rhetoric is less useful to the doctor than logic, 
‘non enim verbis sed herbis aeger curatur’—disease is cured not by words but by herbs.65 From 
this perspective, consolatory philosophical arguments might soothe symptoms, but could not be 
truly effective therapy for a condition with natural corporeal causes.66 
   The idea that treating melancholy was primarily a matter for physicians because of its 
bodily origins was also common in spiritual literature. In England at least, Calvinist spiritual 
writers  offering  comfort  to  those  in  despair  were  generally  careful  to  encroaching  upon  the 
territory of the physician, and many made it clear that their concerns were fundamentally spiritual 
rather than somatic.67 In his Treatise of Melancholie (1586), the divine and physician Timothie Bright 
explained that ‘the affliction of soule through conscience of sinne is quite another thing th[a]n 
melancholy’. The former condition, according to Bright, involved ‘sorrow and feare upon cause 
purely rooted in the ‘mindes [true] apprehension’ of sin and divine wrath, and occurred in people 
whose bodily and psychic health was intact.68 The symptoms of the latter, however, were fear and 
sadness with ‘no ground of true and iust object’, originating in a bodily ‘disorder of humour’ that 
affected the ‘fancy’ in the soul. Melancholics could be susceptible to spiritual affliction because of 
their anxious and contemplative psychological tendencies,69 but the key in such cases was that 
whereas melancholy was a natural condition treatable by medicine, the affliction of conscience 
was  to  be  addressed  with  spiritual  discourse  (‘the  comfort  is  not  procured  by  any  corporal 
instruments’)70 and ultimately alleviated only by divine grace.71 For this reason Bright went on to 
offer a separate ‘consolation unto the afflicted conscience’, a lengthy and thoroughly spiritual 
address for his melancholic friend ‘M.’, which continued the ‘heavenly meditations and spirituall 
conferences’ they had conducted ‘in times past’.72  
Other English Calvinists agreed that the afflicted conscience was not to be confused with 
melancholy. The puritan minister William Perkins, for example, drove a wedge between medicinal 
and spiritual conceptions of mental suffering in his Whole Treatise of the Cases of Conscience (1606), 
arguing  that  the  two  should  be  ‘plainly  distinguished’  for  several  reasons,  not  least  because 
‘imaginations in the braine caused by Melancholy, may be cured, taken away, and cut off by 
meanes of Physicke: but the distresse of Conscience, cannot be cured by any thing in the world 
but one, and that is the blood of Christ, and the assurance of Gods favour.’73 Closer attention to 
melancholy was given by Robert Bolton in his Instructions for a right comforting afflicted consciences  
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(1631), which called for ‘the art, and aide of phisicke’ to ‘bee improov’d, to abate and take off the 
excesse  and  phantasticalnesse  of  this  horrible  humour’.  For  Bolton,  melancholy  could  be 
alleviated through spiritual purification: in the ‘sanctified man’, the ‘melancholicke matter’ could 
be  ‘mollified  and  moderated  by  spirituall  delight,  and  sovereignty  of  grace’,  and  the  sadness 
generated by black bile could be converted into tristitia secundum Deum.74 But Bolton still followed 
Bright  and  Perkins  by  insisting  on  the  distinction  between  melancholy  and  affliction  of 
conscience, principally on the grounds that the former was a corporeal condition treatable by ‘the 
aide  and  excellency  of  the  art  of  physicke’,  rather  than  a  ‘spirituall  distemper’  that  can  be 
comforted only by ‘Christ, Christ, and nothing but Christ’.75 In 1653, Richard Baxter warned the 
melancholic to ‘[e]xpect not that Rational, Spiritual Remedies should suffice for this Cure: For 
you  may  as  well  expect  that  a  good  Sermon  or  comfortable  words  should  cure  the  falling 
Sickness, or Palsie, or a broken head, as to be a sufficient Cure to your Melancholy fears. For this 
is as reall a bodily disease as the other.’76 
However, even if these were good reasons to consider melancholy to be an inappropriate 
condition to treat with moral or spiritual consolation, there were substantial areas of learned 
medicine  in  the  Renaissance  in  which  non-physical  therapies  were  permitted  and  even 
encouraged. On the most general level, there had always been strong tendencies that counteracted 
simplistic materialism within Galenism. Galen himself had argued in the Quod animi mores corporis 
temperamenta sequuntur that the activities of the soul were radically dependent upon the bodily 
mixtures, citing melancholy to illustrate,77 but in the De usu partium he reversed this dependency 
by  referring  to  the  body  as  an  instrument  of  the  soul,78  and  in  other  works,  including  the 
influential De placitis Hippocratis et Platonis, he expressed agnosticism about the precise nature of 
the soul.79 As the French physician André du Laurens wrote in his Des maladies melancholiques 
(1597), Galen’s argument ‘that the maners of the soule doe follow the temperature of the bodie’ is 
‘strong and firme’, but this did not mean that ‘they can altogether commaund and over-rule the 
soule’.80 Following Galen, moreover, did not foreclose the possibility of incorporating moral 
principles into medical theory and practice. He had required ‘the best doctor’ to have knowledge 
of ethics,81 and his treatises on the passions and errors of the soul, which suggested that a moral 
therapy based upon rational self-mastery could produce psychic health, were well known.82  
More specifically, and perhaps most importantly for my concerns here, however, Galen 
had also claimed that although passions were caused by physical qualities, they also changed the 
condition of the body, and had therapeutic potential.83 Medieval Galenists developed this notion 
by formally denoting the passions of the soul as one of the six ‘non-natural’ factors determining 
health or sickness, and this scheme was ubiquitous in Renaissance diagnostics and therapeutics.84 
Discussing  ‘  the  effects  of  ‘the  conceits  and  passions  of  the  mind  upon  the  body’  in  The 
Advancement of Learning, Bacon observed that ‘all wise physicians in the prescriptions of their 
regiments to their patients do ever consider accidentia animi, as of great force to further or hinder 
remedies or recoveries.’85 Hence, following the principle that contraria contrariis curantur, it became 
common in medical discussions of melancholy to claim that the cold and dry disease could be 
alleviated by inducing passions—such as joy—with warm and moist qualities.86 Whilst physical 
therapies were given priority, then, there was a well-recognised space in learned medicine for the 
application  of  moral-philosophical  arguments  and  rhetorical  strategies  to  rectify  emotional 
perturbations. It was for this reason that much of the popular moral psychology of the late 
Renaissance  written  in  the  vernacular,  as  found  in  works  such  as  Pierre  de  la  Primaudaye’s 
L’Academie Françoise (1577)87 or Wright’s Passions of the Minde, could legitimately integrate medical 
and moral doctrines of the passions, and elaborate a conceptual framework which could support 
a consolatory discourse that addressed a bodily disease through the movements of the soul.88 
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Humanist Consolations for Melancholy 
In  what  follows,  I  shall  be  discussing  the  kinds  of  consolatory  argument  that  were 
employed by humanists against melancholy. As we shall see, it is when authors attend to the 
critical  role  of  the  imagination  in  causing  and  alleviating  the  disease  that  the  conventional 
methods of consolation become directly applicable, and making it possible to identify a distinctive 
therapeutic moral psychology for the condition.  
To  my  knowledge,  the  first  humanist  consolatio  to  include  a  substantial  discussion  of 
melancholy  that  was  positively  attentive  to  medical  doctrines  about  the  condition  was  the 
detailed, systematic and wide-ranging De consolatione composed in 1465-6 by the Dalmatian bishop 
Nicolaus of Modruš.89 After a prologue introducing the genre, this work opens with a brief 
typology of the different ways in which grief afflicts those in need of consolation, and then turns 
to aegritudo. Although Nicolaus initially cites scripture to present this condition as the most ‘savage 
pestilence of the soul’—quoting Proverbs 25:20:  ‘As a moth doth by a garment, and a worm by 
the wood: so the sadness of a man consumeth the heart’90—his analysis is sensitive to the somatic 
as well as psychic dimension of the subject. Hence, this scriptural quotation serves as the starting 
point  not for  a  spiritual  meditation,  but  rather  a  physiological  disquisition  on  the  effects  of 
psychic disturbance on the body. Because, he writes, ‘human life consists in a certain motion 
which is diffused from the heart to the other members’, any hindrance or overstimulation of this 
motion disturbs the soul and can even extinguish life.91  
It is because Nicolaus attends to the somatic dimension of aegritudo that his analysis 
incorporates a role for melancholy. Although passions can cause damage by stimulating psychic 
motions—for example when fear provokes the inward contraction of the appetite—Nicolaus 
registers the importance of the medical doctrine that they are even more harmful when they 
administer ‘noxious nutriment’ to the body.92 This is especially the case for the passion of sorrow, 
which is the most harmful to the heart, hindering both this organ, and ultimately the whole soul, 
from functioning properly to maintain the health of the body.93 He is now approaching the 
territory of melancholia:  
 
Hence [the soul] is dried and contracted by the coldness, and the humour of 
that kind, which the Greeks call melancholy, swells up and becomes more 
violently powerful. And since it is sometimes dry and icy cold, it occupies the 
passages of the vital spirits, nor does it allow the members to keep warm; and 
deprived of nutriment in this way, they stop flourishing and being vigorous, 
and are more diminished by the day to the end that they are consumed to the 
point of exhaustion.94 
 
This process is then illustrated poetically with quotations from Ovid that testify to the 
debilitating  effects  of  anxietas  animi  on  the  body;95  but  Nicolaus  continues  to  interleave  his 
account with medical details, noting that as therapies for this condition physicians prescribe sleep, 
warm  baths  (measures  also  employed  by  Augustine  to  assuage  his  grief  at  the  death  of  his 
mother), drinking of wine, and other measures to moisten the body and strengthen its native 
heat.96 
  This  is  only  a  partial  rendering  of  the  Renaissance  medical  theory  of  melancholy. 
Nicolaus’s principal concern here—with the manner in which the passion of sorrow can destroy 
the health of the body, in this case by stimulating black bile—appears to give melancholy a 
subsidiary role in his analysis as in some cases an effect of aegritudo, which is thereby treatable by 
consolatory methods.97 This is supported by the later discussion of the apparent paradox that 
sorrow can be alleviated by lamentation (IV.9). Recalling the classical insight that there exists a  
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voluptas dolendi, and that grief ‘evacuates’ itself through tears,98 Nicolaus proceeds to explain this 
phenomenon with a psychological account that again refers to the role of black bile. ‘Grief’, he 
writes,  
 
has a double seat, one in the body and the other in the soul: in the body, the 
melancholic humour, which, as physicians teach, is particularly in the brain; 
and in the soul, certainly in the imagination or the opinion of certain evils by 
which it perceives itself to be oppressed.99 
 
Weeping could perhaps be thought to alleviate grief, then, because in the first place, it is 
‘a certain purging of bad [sc. melancholic] humours’.100 In the second place, and more interestingly 
for Nicolaus, this is because ‘opinions of bad things can be diminished by lamentations and 
complaints’. In part this is a psychological effect of grieving, which is not a purely painful process 
but also involves pleasure, through the stirring up of memories of past goods and the anticipation 
of future relief—‘by which it happens that all lamentation, just as with anger, contains a mixture 
of pleasure with grief.’101 But it is also because the soul, which has been tormenting itself in its 
fixation upon the species-image of an evil, is expanded by lamentation outwards to the exterior 
parts, ‘and from there, by consuming cares in a certain way, drives many of them away from 
itself.’102 Hence the pleasure experienced by some who grieve in solitude, and the potentially 
therapeutic effects of the provocation of lamentation in consolation.103 
  Although Nicolaus was familiar with the medical theory of melancholy, and although he 
deemed the role of black bile in sorrow as an aspect of medical psychology that was relevant to 
the procedures of consolation, it would be misleading to say that he was concerned in this work 
with consolation for melancholy. The therapy here is directed at the condition of aegritudo, in 
which black bile sometimes has a secondary role, and which is therefore also a feature of some 
cases of melancholy.104  
  In fact, it is only in the literature of late humanism (influenced, in all likelihood, by the 
contemporary works of moral psychology noted above, which fused ethical and medical doctrines 
of the passions) that we can find explicit and substantial discussion of the moral therapies for 
melancholy. In Stefano Guazzo’s La civile conversatione (1574)—not formally a consolatio but a work 
of social philosophy concerned with courtly or ‘civil’ sociability105—melancholy has a central role 
as the condition for which sociable ‘civil conversation’ is the remedy.106 Here we find an ethical 
account of melancholy that is based upon the reciprocal relationship of soul and body. Guazzo 
also expresses the claim, which as we have seen is characteristic of consolatory discourse, that 
tranquillity  and  bodily  health  can  be  restored  by  the  correction  of  false  beliefs  and  the 
manipulation of the imagination. 
At the beginning of Guazzo’s work we are introduced to the author’s brother Guglielmo, 
who complains that he is ‘oppresso da così grave malinconia’ that the condition seems to be 
incurable  by  medicine.107  The  response  of  the  philosopher  and  physician  Annibale  is  to 
distinguish between disease of the body and that of the mind,108 and it is subsequently implied 
that his interlocutor’s melancholy is principally a case of the latter. When Guglielmo complains 
that he is unable to expel his ‘torbidi pensieri’, Annibale’s first step is to ask his patient to recall to 
his  mind  things  he  has  observed  to  have  increased  or  diminished  his  condition—which  he 
pointedly terms ‘vostra afflizzione d’animo, o malinconia, che chiamar la vogliamo.’109 In the 
ensuing discussion, where Guglielmo expresses his aversion to company and love of solitude, 
Annibale argues that although medical doctors are unable to help, Guglielmo nevertheless has the 
cure in his own hands. He needs only to recognise and uproot the cause, which is located in the  
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psychological domain. It is, quite simply, ‘la falsa imaginazione’ that the ‘vita solitaria’ will give 
him comfort.  
Actually, as Annibale explains, this ‘falsa imaginazione’—a notion identified by Heinrich 
Salmuth in his Latin translation of 1596 with that of ‘prava imaginatio’, a phrase often employed 
in contemporary medical discussions of melancholia110—generates ‘mali umori’ in the body,  which 
then cause an aversion to excitement and conversation.111 As the cause of the affliction is in the 
mind, albeit mediated by corrupt humours, so is the cure, following the medical consensus that ‘a 
conseguire la salute del corpo è utile e necessaria la sodisfazzione dell’animo’. If Guglielmo can 
reject his pathogenic belief concerning the benefits of solitude, he will be able to discover that la 
conversazione is the ‘antidote’ to his melancholy and the ‘fondamento della vita’.112 Guazzo’s ethical 
remedy  for  comfort  is  thereby  constituted,  in  the  first  place,  by  the  correction of  the  ‘falsa 
imaginazione’  of  the melancholic  sufferer  about  his  own  nature:  man  is  naturally  an  ‘animal 
sociabile’ who takes pleasure in company, and to prefer solitude is to offend nature herself. 
Melancholics who enclose themselves ‘in quelle volontarie prigioni’ become dreary, emaciated, 
forlorn, full of putrified blood, and subject to a host of powerful and deranged fantasies (‘forti e 
farnetiche imaginazioni’); the outcome is frequently misery, misanthropy and suicide.113 Once the 
melancholic has dropped this false understanding of his own nature, however, he will be able to 
restore his physical and mental health by embracing the pleasurable sociability appropriate to his 
humanity, engaging in social transactions in the occasionally corrupt world ‘in body’, and ‘in 
mind’ with virtuous, like-minded companions in the domestic and ‘civil’ domains.114 Here, then, 
the  application  by  the  philosopher-physician  Annibale  of  therapeutic  argumentation,  in  the 
manner of the consolatio, is made possible by the identification of Guglielmo’s melancholy as in 
origin an affliction of mind (notwithstanding its somatic symptomology) and therefore one whose 
appropriate cure is addressed to the imagination and beliefs of the sufferer. 
 
Burton’s ‘Consolatory Digression’ 
The  most  substantial  and  systematic  integration  of  moral-consolatory  discourse  and 
medical theory in the Renaissance was given in Burton’s Anatomy. It is here, undoubtedly, that the 
classical  humanist  remedy  for  psychic  disturbance—by  means  of  philosophical  wisdom  and 
literary-rhetorical eloquence—received its most sustained application to the melancholic disease. 
As in the writings of Nicolaus of Modruš and Guazzo,115 it is the central role given to the faculty 
of  imagination—indeed,  Burton’s  conception  of  melancholy  as  above  all  a  disease  of  the 
imagination—that was the basis of his approach, which developed ideas and themes found in 
earlier consolatory works but articulated them in a degree of detail that was unprecedented. 
In the first Partition of the Anatomy, Burton discussed the contemporary medical disputes 
concerning the affected part in melancholy, settling on the view that this was primarily the brain, 
‘as the seat of Reason’, and secondarily the heart, ‘as the seat of Affection.’ A further dispute had 
arisen, however, about which faculty of soul within the brain was primarily affected, whether the 
imagination (the ‘inner sense’ which processed and produced sense-data), or the reason itself 
(which comprehended and judged those data).116 Burton sided with the Paduan physician Alberto 
Bottoni, for whom ‘it is first in Imagination, and afterwards in reason’, glossing this in the second 
edition of 1624 with the view of another Paduan doctor, Ercole Sassonia, that the powers of 
‘faith, opinion, discourse, ratiocination, are all accidentally depraved by the default of Imagination.’117 
Although the  Anatomy  presented  a  comprehensive  medical  account  of  melancholy  in 
which the ‘materiall cause’ of black bile was given a conventionally fundamental role,118  and 
which listed an array of other causes—from God, angels or evil spirits, witches and magicians, 
and  the  stars,  to  old  age,  parents,  bad  diet,  the  retention  and  evacuation  of  various  bodily 
substances, bad air, idleness, and sleeping and waking—Burton’s account placed heavy emphasis  
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upon the causal role of the remaining ‘non-natural’ factor, the passions of the soul.119 These were, 
for him, ‘the greatest of all’ causes, capable of generating ‘violent and speedy alterations in this 
our Microcosme’: 
 
For as the Body workes upon the minde, by his bad humours, troubling the 
Spirits, sending grosse fumes into the Braine; and so per consequens disturbing 
the Soule …. so on the other side, the minde most effectually workes upon 
the  Body,  producing  by  his  passions  and  perturbations,  miraculous 
alterations; as Melancholy, despaire, cruell diseases, and sometimes death it 
selfe. 
 
This position is grounded in the works of the classical philosophers, who ‘impute the 
miseries of the Body to the Soule, that should have governed it better, by command of reason, 
and hath not done it’,120 which are supported, as he says, by scripture, the early Christian fathers, 
and neoteric philosophers such as Juan Luis Vives, all of whom regard immoderate passions as 
‘diseases’.121  
More particularly, Burton’s explanation of how melancholy can be generated by passions 
drew extensively upon contemporary ideas about the imagination,122 which as we have seen was 
the faculty deemed responsible for the composition of mental images, and was also involved in 
the generation of emotions and judgements. Usually, Burton noted, ‘it is subject and governed by 
Reason, or at least should be’; but in melancholics ‘this faculty is most Powerfull and strong, and 
often hurts, producing many monstrous and prodigious things’.123 Because the imagination (via 
the spirits) could affect the heart and the humours, if that faculty was ‘very apprehensive, intent, 
and violent’, it ‘makes a deeper impression, and greater tumult’ upon the body. Hence it is that 
‘the  first  steppe  and  fountaine  of  all  our  grievances  in  this  kinde,  is  læsa  Imaginatio,  which 
misinforming the Heart, causeth all these distemperatures, alteration and confusion of spirits and 
humours.’ In fact, so ‘great is the force of Imagination’ for Burton, that ‘much more ought the 
cause of Melancholy to be ascribed to this alone, then to the temperature of the body’.124  
The importance of the imagination for Burton’s account was underlined by his digression 
‘Of the Force of Imagination’, which drew heavily upon sixteenth-century disquisitions about the 
‘strange and evident effects’ of this faculty and underlined its therapeutic as well as pathogenic 
potential.125 On the one hand, the imagination ‘most especially rageth in melancholy persons, in 
keeping  the  species  of  objects  so  long, mistaking,  amplifying  them by  continuall  and  strong 
meditation, until at length it produceth in some parties reall effects, causeth this and many other 
maladies.’126 And such imaginative derangement could, as we saw above, provoke misjudgement 
and moral vice, since it replaced ‘that which is right and good’ with ‘falsehood’.127 On the other 
hand, the same power provided means by which melancholy may be treated.  Just as ‘some are so 
molested  by  Phantasie;  so  some  againe  by  Fancy  alone,  and  a  good  conceit,  are  as  easily 
recovered’.  As  Pomponazzi  had  shown,  apparently  magical  cures  could  be  attributed  to  the 
effects of ‘a strong conceit and opinion alone … which forceth a motion of the humours, spirits and bloud 
[and] takes away the cause of the maladie from the parts affected’.128 Furthermore, as Burton pointed out, 
according  to  Paracelsus,  Johann  Weyer,  Antoine  Mizald,  François  Valleriola,  Giulio  Cesare 
Vanini,  Tommaso  Campanella,  and  ‘many  [other]  Phylosophers’  including  Avicenna  and  Al-
Kindi, the transformative physiological power of the imagination could apply also apply externally 
to the bodies of others. For these authors, ‘the forcible imagination of the one party’ was able to 
move and alter ‘the spirits of the other’, and thereby ‘cause and cure not only diseases, maladies 
and severall infirmities, by this meanes ... in parties remote’, but even ‘move bodies in their places, 
cause thunder, lightning, [and] tempests’.129   
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This conception of the imagination as a powerful faculty that was at once an instrumental 
cause  of  health  or  disease,  and  a  potential  source  of  false  belief  and  moral  defect,  gave  a 
substantial psychological underpinning to Burton’s employment of ‘Philosophicall and Divine 
precepts’  in  his  ‘Consolatory  Digression’  for  melancholic  perturbations.130  Although  in  the 
orthodox definition of melancholy it was a species of irrational delirium, this did not mean, except 
in  the  most  severe  cases,  that  melancholics  were  totally  unsusceptible  to  reasoning.  Most 
contemporary Galenic physicians agreed that the imagination was the primarily affected part in 
this disease, with reason only being secondarily affected.131 When theories of the disease were 
elaborated in fine detail in the later sixteenth century, it was often stated that unlike mania, 
melancholy only entailed a partial or temporary occlusion of reason.132 The fact that melancholics’ 
rational  capacities  could  be  damaged  but  were  rarely  destroyed  made  them  susceptible  to 
therapeutic arguments: just as the psychological disturbances experienced by melancholics were 
to  be  explained  by  analysing  their  imagination,  as  the  source  of  misleading  and  distressing 
phantasms, so the effects of the corrupt imagination could be counteracted or eased by rational 
psychological measures, such as conversation with friends.133 Burton claimed that as ‘the medium 
deferens of passions, by whose meanes they work and produce many times prodigious effects’, 
acting therapeutically upon the imagination, no less than upon the humours, would alleviate the 
passions of the melancholic.134 This mitigated the fatalistic implications of the material basis of 
the condition in humoral distemper, and made the sufferer at least potentially receptive to ‘good 
precepts’  that  could  curb  the  force  of  his  or  her  perturbations.  Whilst  the  occurrence  of 
melancholic  passions  was  ‘a  naturall  infirmity’  rooted  in  ‘innate  humors’  as  well  as  ‘outward 
occurrences’,  then,  such  rational  precepts  could  be  ‘put  in  practise’  by  practical  methods  of 
addressing the ‘vaine, false, frivolous Imaginations, absurd conceits, fained feares and sorrowes, from which’, as 
the French physician Nicholas Le Pois (Piso) had written in his De cognoscendis et curandis praecipue 
internis humani corporis morbis (1580), ‘this disease primarily proceeds’.135 
Psychological therapies for melancholic perturbations were to be administered, Burton 
instructed, either by the sufferer him- or herself, or, if s/he was incapable of so doing, by a friend. 
The first therapy was simply for the melancholic to ‘resist, and withstand the beginnings’ of the 
imaginative  depravation  by  avoiding  whatever  had  provoked  it,  or  meditating  upon  ‘some 
contrary object’ to dispel it from his imagination; here the imagination was worked upon, but not 
rectified.136 The second, directed against the notion that the perturbation was ‘within his blood, 
his braines, his whole temperature’ and ‘cannot be removed’, was for the sufferer to ‘choose 
whether  he  will  give  way  too  fare  unto  it’.  It  was  possible,  therefore,  to  overcome  ‘corrupt 
phantasy’ in classical fashion with rational correction by an act of the will, since ‘whatsoever the 
Will  desires,  shee  may  command:  no  such  cruell  affections,  but  by  discipline  they  may  bee 
tamed’.137 Burton glossed this process in the terms of Aristotelian faculty psychology: the will—
the ‘Rationall power of ‘moving’, which was located in the rational part of the soul and instructed 
by reason138—should over-rule the ‘sensitive’ and ‘voluntary’ appetites—the sources, respectively, 
of inclinations shared by ‘men and Brutes’ and the passions—in the sensitive soul.139 Hence, ‘[i]f 
appetite will not obey, let the moving faculty over-rule her, let her resist and compell her to doe 
otherwise. In an ague, the appetite would drinke: sore eyes that itch, would be rubbed, but reason 
saith no, & therefore the moving faculty will not doe it. Our phantasie would intrude a thousand 
feares, suspitions, Chimeras upon us, but we have reason to resist …’.140 If, however, rational 
self-discipline proved impossible, ‘as in this disease commonly it is’, we should turn to a friend, to 
whom we might ‘impart out misery’, and from whom we should seek ‘counsell … wisdome, 
perswasion, advise’ and ‘good meanes, which we could not otherwise apply unto our selves.’141 
This, then, was the moral-psychological framework within which Burton would apply 
consolation  to  melancholy.142  In  his  discussion  of  ‘Helpe  from  Friends  by  Counsell  …’,  he  
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underlined that rectificatory  remedies  worked  by  means  of the  imagination,143  and  turned  to 
Plutarch’s Consolatio ad Apollonium for the Aeschylan dictum ‘Oratio namque saucii animi est remedium, 
a gentle speech is the true cure of a wounded soule’.144 Burton’s therapeutic rationale thereby 
drew upon a conjunction of—on the one hand—a classical humanist combination of philosophy 
and rhetoric (‘a wise and well spoken man may doe what he will in such a case, a good Orator 
alone, as Tully holds, can alter affections by power of his eloquence’) and—on the other—Galenic 
medical  psychology:  ‘As  Imagination,  feare,  griefe,  cause  such  passions,  so  conceipts  alone, 
rectified by good hope, counsell, &c. are able againe to helpe’.145 This is why consolation, whether 
delivered  by  a  friend  or  a  book  such  as  his  own,  could  provide  ‘a  sole  sufficient  cure’  of 
melancholy’.146 
 
Conclusion: Burton’s Consolation for Melancholy 
We  have  seen  that  at  its  core,  humanist  consolation  was  a  form  of  cognitive  and 
imaginative therapy. It treated the perturbations of the soul in a conventionally classical fashion, 
applying wisdom—in the form of philosophical and spiritual precepts—with the assistance of 
eloquence. This would have the effect of changing the beliefs and perceptions of the sufferer, and 
redirecting and fortifying his or her will, all of which would in term enable the moderation or 
extirpation of disturbing passions by bringing them into the province of recta ratio. Such was the 
basic therapeutic structure of the consolatio, and, as is indicated by the circumstances specified in 
the subtitles of Burton’s ‘Consolatory Digression’, it was used for the treatment of perturbations 
that could arise from a very wide range of causes: ‘Deformity of Body, Sicknesse, Basenesse of 
Birth’,  ‘Poverty  and  Want,  with  such  other  Adversities’,  ‘Servitude,  Losse  of  Liberty, 
Imprisonment,  Banishment’,  ‘Death  of  Friends  or  otherwise,  Vaine  Feare’,  ‘Envy,  Livor, 
Emulation, Hatred, Ambition, Selfe-Love, and all other Affections’, ‘Repulse, Abuses, Injuries, 
Contempts, Disgraces, Contumelies, Slanders, Scoffes, &c.’.147 We have also seen, however, that 
the passions arising from melancholy constituted a problematic but special case for consolatory 
authors. When those authors chose to enter the territory of melancholy rather than leave it to the 
physicians, they offered significant contributions to the development of a practical strand of late 
humanist  moral  and  spiritual  psychology.  Whereas  consolations  for  diseases  had  tended  to 
concentrate simply on the ethical necessity of coming to terms with physical pain and the reality 
of  mortality,  when  the  psychic  as  well  as  somatic  character  of  melancholy  was  considered, 
moralists began to develop a more sophisticated form of treatment that integrated ethical and 
spiritual precepts within the framework of Galenic medical psychology. Consolation aimed at the 
imagination of the melancholic permitted, as Burton put it, not only the therapy of ‘animam per 
corpus’ in the manner of the physicians, but also ‘corpus per animam’.148 In this respect, Burton’s 
‘Consolatory Digression’ represents the most fully developed instance of the humanist consolatio. I 
would like to end this essay, however, by drawing attention not only to the generically typical 
aspects of the digression, but also, by way of contrast, to certain of its idiosyncrasies which 
thereby come into sharper relief. 
There are several conspicuous features of the ‘Consolatory Digression’ that fit squarely 
within  the  humanist  consolatory  tradition.  Despite  some  satirical  passages,149  it  is  mainly  an 
encyclopedic collection of Christian spiritual and classical moral precepts for curbing a variety of 
passions in rather conventional fashion.150 Alongside a host of classical moral arguments designed 
to  alleviate  or  curb  disturbing  passions,  it  included  injunctions  to  consider the  constancy  of 
Job,151 follow the example of Christ,152 cultivate the spiritual virtues of ‘love, charity, meeknesse,’ 
and ‘patience’,153 and generally to ‘scorne this transitory state’.154 Nevertheless, these Christian 
doctrines did not transform the classical core of Burton’s consolatory discourse, which aimed to  
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uproot or counteract melancholic passions by correcting ‘false conceaved’155 ethical beliefs about 
self and world.156  
Another  generically  typical  feature  of  Burton’s  consolatio  is  his  emphasis  on  the 
predominantly cognitive psychological character of the passions, which was consistent with his 
preceding  account  of  why  melancholy  is  treatable  by  consolation.  The  digression  offered 
arguments to comfort or extinguish specific passions (which in Burton’s account could either 
cause melancholy or be symptoms that exacerbated the condition) arising from particular events 
in  the  external  world,157  and  these  arguments  were  thought  to  work  by  modifying  the  false 
judgements about the world that were the root of such passions. Hence, ‘’tis in our owne power, 
as they say, to make or marre our selves’, as in the case of the misery provoked by poverty: 
 
All things then being rightly examined and duly considered as they ought, 
there is no such cause of so generall discontent, ‘tis not in the matter it selfe, 
but in our mind, as we moderate our passions and esteeme of things. Nihil 
aliud necessarium ut sis miser (saith Cardan) quam ut se te miserum credas, Let thy 
fortune be what it will, ‘tis thy minde alone that makes thee poore or rich, 
miserable or happy.158  
  
Here,  then,  was  a  basically  classical  conception  of  the  necessity  of  psychic  self-
management to tranquillity—with perhaps a specifically Epictetian emphasis on the proper usage 
of  phantasiai159—which  assumed  a  degree  of  autonomy  on  the  part  of  the  sufferer.  The 
efficaciousness of consolation was premised upon some degree of freedom of the will, enabling 
the rectification of imaginative errors. 
  However, Burton’s ‘Consolatory Digression’ also included an innovative, and also rather 
puzzling ending in a subsection entitled ‘Against Melancholy It Selfe’. This went beyond the 
conventional consolatory task of offering arguments against specific passions, and aimed instead 
to console the melancholic with regard to his or her melancholy in general. The ‘melancholy man’ 
was, he claimed, wrong to think that his misery—encompassed by ‘Wearines of life, abhorring all 
company and light, feare, sorrow, suspition, anguish of minde, bashfulnesse, and those other 
dread Symptomes of body and mind’—was quite so bad.160 Melancholy could be cured (but only 
if not hereditary and caught early);161 if incurable, the suffering could be punctuated with ‘lucida 
intervalla’; if continuous, it could be ‘more durable … then dangerous’ (though it frequently ends 
in suicide);162 and it was annexed with ‘some comforts’, such as being non-contagious. Although 
the disease gave rise to a host of moral failings,163 some comfort was also to be gleaned, Burton 
claimed,  from  the  fact  that  its  symptoms  also  tended  to  preclude  certain  vices—shyness 
prevented ambition and impudence, fear and sorrow kept melancholics ‘temperate and sober’.164  
These arguments for the symptoms of melancholy being ‘not so haynous as they be 
taken’ seem now to be rather weak in comparison with those found in the rest of the consolatio, 
not least because they run against the grain of much that Burton wrote elsewhere in the Anatomy 
about the genuine and profound pain caused by the disease.165 But to understand the nature of 
the overarching argument being delivered here, I think we first need to consider the general 
attitudes towards human existence typically built into classical consolationes. These works were 
largely concerned with comforting forms of distress arising in particular situations—the death of 
a loved one, loss of fortune, and so on—and generically their precepts were based upon stock 
ethical observations concerning the brevity of life, the mutability of fortuna, and the fallibility and 
fragility of human plans and aspirations. They did not, in other words, seek to remedy dejection 
with optimism, but aimed to adjust the outlook of the sufferer so that it came into line with a 
realistic form of pessimism. They attempted to reconcile the sufferer to human life in the world  
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as it really was, pointing to the inevitable capriciousness of the external world for everyone, and 
extolling inner virtues such as constancy and fortitude as preconditions for inner tranquillity. 
They integrated the pain of the individual sufferer with that of the moral community of humanity. 
In the Christian consolatory tradition, this way of conceiving human life was often preserved in a 
qualified form. Our precarious and painful earthly existence was devalued anyway in the light of 
the world to come, so awareness of its transitoriness was preparatory for a comforting redirection 
of attention towards heavenly tranquillity in the eternal future.166 
This  realistic  and  sometimes  moderated  pessimism  about  human  life  in  this  world 
explains  why  reading  classically  modelled  consolations—their  aim  to  offer  comfort 
notwithstanding—is often a harsh and depressing experience for modern readers. But the same 
reaction was sometimes anticipated by ancient and Renaissance authors: Scala recalled the story 
of Hegesias of Cyrene, whose argument that human life was painful and contemptible was so 
strong and lengthy that ‘he made so many weary of life’, and Ptolemy had to force him to stop.167 
Scala also had Cosimo compel the recognition ‘that it is the human condition itself which is most 
greatly to be mourned’,168 and depicted himself responding with the lament that he had ‘done a 
fine job of making us all miserable’.169 This gloomy tradition was continued by Burton, for whom 
‘we are all miserable and discontent, who can deny it?’170 Indeed, he was clear that by portraying 
‘the unconstancy of humane felicity’ and ‘others misery’, his consolatio would bring those who are 
happy back to a condition of ‘moderation’ and help them to attain true self-knowledge.171 He 
even worried that some melancholics, because of their overactive or damaged imaginations, might 
‘trouble or hurt’ themselves by reading parts of his book.172 
  Such pessimism about the fragility and difficulty of human existence, however, seems 
superficial  when  compared  with  the  more  deep-seated  kind  identified  by  Nietzsche  as  ‘the 
wisdom  of  Silenus’—the  ancient  idea  that  even  the  finest  human  life  is  so  inadequate  and 
unbearable that ‘the very best thing’ would be ‘not to have been born, not to be, to be nothing’, 
and ‘the second best thing for you is: to die soon.’ Correctly understood, according to this view, 
human life is never worth living, and must be completely rejected.173 For Scala’s Cosimo, Silenus’s 
wisdom was ‘valuable in understanding life’,174 since (despite the outlawing of suicide) ‘divine 
testimony’ taught us ‘that we should prefer death to life’; it was regrettable that although old he 
was not yet dead.175 According to Scala, the only effective comfort for this predicament was to be 
found  in  the  Platonic  doctrine  that  philosophy  is  a  meditation  on  death:  we  would  never 
encounter anything other than ‘a shadow of the true and real good’ until the rational soul was 
released from our bodily prison and reunited with God.176 The ‘laborious futility of living’ was to 
be fled, the release of death was ardently to be desired.177 The sufferer was to be reconciled with 
their pain through coming to accept that this was the reality ordained by divine providence.178 In 
a similarly Silenian moment, but expressing this thought by means of the patristic contemptus mundi, 
Burton wrote that ‘our life is tedious and troublesome unto him that lives best, ’tis a misery to be 
borne, a paine to live, a trouble to die, death makes an end of our miseries’.179  
Against this background, Burton’s consolatory contention that misery was not to be 
considered wholly bad for the melancholic is not so peculiar. Whatever we are supposed think of 
the individual merits of his arguments about the benefits of melancholic symptoms, they are really 
just setting the scene for the conclusion of the consolatio as a paradoxical praise of the disease as a 
source of virtue, wisdom and (in some sense) happiness: 
 
Wearisomenesse  of  life,  makes  them  they  are  not  so  besotted,  on  the 
transitory vaine pleasures of the world. If they dote in one thing they are wise 
and well understanding in most other. If it be inveterate, they are insensati, 
most part doting, or quite mad, insensible of any wrongs, ridiculous to others,  
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but most happy and secure to themselves. Dotage is a state which many 
much magnifie and commend: so is simplicity, and folly …. Some thinke 
fooles and disards live the merriest lives …. These curious arts and laborious 
sciences, Galens, Tullies, Aristotles, Justinians, doe but trouble the world some 
thinke, we might live better with that illiterate Virginian simplicity, and grosse 
ignorance,  entire  Ideots  doe  best,  they  are  not  macerated  with  cares, 
tormented with feares, and anxietie, as other wise men are …. They are no 
dissemblers, liers, hypocrites, for fooles and mad men tell commonly truth.180  
 
It was not just that worldly suffering could be eased by the prospect of heavenly bliss, or 
that tribulations in this life were sent to test us and give us the opportunity to express moral and 
spiritual virtue. It was that (following 1 Cor. 1:18-31) everything in this shadowy world could be 
seen as an inversion of the luminous world beyond, that failure in this life was success in heaven. 
Given Burton’s fondness for Erasmus,181 it is perhaps no coincidence that this was one of the 
central Pauline premises of the Moriae encomium; and here lies the principal implication of Burton’s 
closing consolatory argument ‘against’ melancholy: in this world melancholy was madness, but in 
the next, madness was true wisdom. This spiritual reason is why Burton’s consolatio stipulated that 
the poor would go to heaven, and the rich would go to hell,182 and why it culminated with the 
deeply equivocal consolation for melancholics that they should positively embrace their suffering. 
According to Burton, it was ‘better to be sad then merry … [it is] better to be miserable [than] 
happy: of two extreames it is the best.’183 That now seems to be a truly melancholic consolation 
for melancholy.184 
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medicinalium libri XX (Venice, 1542), IV.5, 40-1, which recommends moral and spiritual therapies for a 
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79 See Donini, P., “Psychology”, in The Cambridge Companion to Galen, ed. R. J. Hankinson (Cambridge: 
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94 Nicolaus of Modruš, De consolatione, I.2.11-12: “Itaque exsiccatur ac gelu constringitur humorque eius 
generis, quem Graeci melancholiam appellant, incrementum capit ac invalescit vehementius; et quoniam 
siccus quodammodo ac gelidus est, itinera spirituum vitalium occupat, nec foveri membra permittit, atque 
ita nutrimento subtracto virere vigereque desinunt et in dies extenuantur magis ac usque ad exinanitionem 
consumuntur.” 
95 Nicolaus of Modruš, De consolatione, I.2.12-14, citing Epistulae ex Ponto I.10.3-4, 25-8, 35-6. 
96 Nicolaus of Modruš, De consolatione, I.2.15-19: “Proinde tali morbo laborantibus suadent medici somnum, 
vinum,  balnea  calida  caeteraque  eiusmodi  quae  humectare  irrigareqwue  corpus  iuvant  ac  nativum 
confirmant  calorem.  Quorum  opem  haud  mediocrem  et  Augustinus  nono  Confessionum  libro  [Conf. 
IX.12.32] se sensisse fatetur.” 
97 The reasoning here appears to be that those cases of melancholy which are caused by sorrow (moeror) are 
thereby classifiable as a subspecies of aegritudo. Presumably cases of melancholy though to have originated 
purely in a somatic imbalance would not be related to aegritudo in this way, and would not therefore be 
deemed treatable with consolatory therapy.  
 
 
Society and Politics                                                                                            Vol. 6, No. 1(11)/April 2012 
  35 
 
98  Nicolaus  here  quotes  Ovid,  Tristia  IV.3.37-8:  “est  quedam    flere  voluptas  /  Expletur  lachrimis 
egeriturque dolor.” (Nicolaus of Modruš, De consolatione IV.9.3.) Cf. the discussion of tristitia in Petrarch, De 
remediis utriusque fortunae libri II (Lyon, 1577), II.xciii, 732. 
99 Nicolaus of Modruš, De consolatione, IV.9.6: “Id uero ista ratione contingere predicant quoniam, cum 
mæror duplicem habeat sedem, unam in corpore et in animo alteram; in corpore melancoliæ humorem qui, 
ut phisici docent, precipuus in cerebro est, in animo uero fantasiam aut opinionem malorum quibus se 
oppressum cernit.” 
100 Nicolaus of Modruš, De consolatione, IV.9.7: “quod ploratus quædam erat malorum humorum purgatio.” 
101 Nicolaus of Modruš, De consolatione, IV.9.8-10: “Sed de humore aut purgatione eius utcunque illud tamen 
in  dubia  fide  tenendum  est,  lamentationibus  et  querelis  opinionem  malorum  opido  extenuari,  cuius 
multiplex  causa  est,  sed  precipua  quoniam  in  lamentatione  pergit  homo  enumerando  præterita  bona, 
quorum sicut possessio fuit iocunda, ita et recordatio, quo fit ut omnis lamentatio, ueluti et ira, admixtam 
habeat  cum  dolore  uoluptatem  ….    Et  rursum  lamentationibus  mitigatur  ægritudo  quoniam  omnis 
lamentatio  cum  uoluptate  est  ex  eo  quod  homo  malis  honeratus  lachrimando  et  querendo  putat 
conuenientia sibi abire munera; omnis uero eo quod quis sibi conueniens ducit oblectari necesse est.” 
102 Nicolaus of Modruš, De consolatione, IV.9.9: “leuant quoque questus dolorem et ista ratione quod animus, 
dum  continet  intra  se  mali  speciem,  totus  circa  illam  occupatur  et  eam  intuendo  diutius  uehementius 
affligitur et cruciatur; cum uero plorat aut querelas fundit, animus ad exteriora expanditur et ab illa urente 
cura quodammodo se non parua ex parte auertit.” The precise physiological sense of this passage is unclear 
to me. 
103 Nicolaus of Modruš, De consolatione, IV.9.11-14. 
104 On aegritudo and melancholy see note 51 above. 
105 On Guazzo and his influence, see Lievsay, J., Stefano Guazzo and the English Renaissance, 1575–1675 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1961); Javitch, D., “Rival Arts of Conduct in Elizabethan 
England: Guazzo’s Civile Conversatione and Castiglione’s Courtier”, Yearbook of Italian Studies 1 (1971): 178-97; 
Auernheimer, R., Gemeinschaft und Gespräch, Guazzos Begriff der “conversazione civile” (Munich, 1973); Bonfatti, 
E., La “Civil conversatione” in Germania: Letteratura del comportamento da Stefano Guazzo a Adolph Knigge, 1574–
1788 (Udine, 1979); and Miller, P. N., “Friendship and Conversation in Seventeenth-Century Venice”, 
Journal of Modern History 73/ 1 (2001): 1-31. 
106 Recent readings exploring this aspect of the work include Miller, P.N., Peiresc’s Europe: Learning and Virtue 
in the Seventeenth Century (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2000), 68-73, 146-9, 158-9; Patrizi, 
G., “Una retorica del molteplice: forme di vita e forme del sapere nella ‘civil conversatione’”, and Frigo, D., 
“‘Civil conversatione’ e pratica del mondo: Le relazioni domestiche”, both in Stefano Guazzo e la Civile 
Conversatione, ed. G. Patrizi (Rome: Bulzoni, 1990). 
107 Guazzo, S., La civil conversatione, ed. A. Quondam (Modena: Panini, 1993), 2 vols, vol. I, 15. 
108 Guazzo, S., La civil conversatione, ed. Quondam, vol. I, 15: “Per quello che tocca all’infermità del corpo …. 
Ma per quello che riguarda l’infermità dell’animo”. 
109 Guazzo, S., La civil conversatione, ed. Quondam, vol. I, 16-17: “E perciò loderei che vi veniste ricordando 
di quelle cose che per lunga osservazione avete trovato che abbiano accresciuta o scemata questa vostra 
afflizzione d’animo, o malinconia, che chiamar la vogliamo.” 
110 Guazzo, S., De civili conversatione, libri quatuor, trans. and ed. H. Salmuth, (Thuringen, 1598), 2nd edn, 10-
11: “Ac cum Melancholicus & Gravida liberati fuerint; haec a gustu depravato; ille a prava imaginatione 
…”; cf., for instance, Ercole Sassonia, De melancholia [1620], chs. II, IV, in Opera practica (Padua, 1639), 7b-
8b, 11b, et sqq. 
111 Guazzo, S., La civil conversatione, ed. Quondam, vol. I, 16-17: “Ella è, se nol sapete, la falsa imaginazione 
vostra, con la quale, a guisa di farfalla, gite con diletto procacciando la vostra morte, e in iscambio di 
consumare il male, voi lo nodrite: perché pensando di ricever alleggiamento per mezo della vita solitaria, vi 
tirate  addosso  una  soma  di  mali  umori,  i  quali  come  ribelli  dell'allegrezza  e  della  conversazione,  si 
concentrano nelle viscere e cercano di nascondersi nelle solitudini conformi alla natura loro.” 
112 Guazzo, S., La civil conversatione, ed. Quondam,  vol. I, 16-17: “Onde vorrei che lasciando questa sinistra 
credenza con la quale vi sete fino ad ora medicato a rovescio, cominciaste a mutar stile e a proporvi la 
solitudine per veleno e la conversazione per antidoto e fondamento della vita, disponendovi di perder 
l’affezzione a quella come a concubina, e di ricever in grazia quest’altra come legittima sposa.”  
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113 Guazzo, S., La civil conversatione, ed. Quondam,  vol. I, 17-18: “Lascio di raccontarvi i casi avvenuti a 
diversi  uomini,  i  quali  per  lo  stare  lungo  tempo  in  solitudine  sono  entrati  in  così  forti  e  farnetiche 
imaginazioni, che hanno dato soggetto di riso e di compassione. Onde per le cose che si leggono presso a' 
nostri dottori e per quelle ch'io ho vedute, non mi pare punto strano essempio quel che volgarmente si 
racconta d'un meschino, che pensando d'esser trasformato in un grano di miglio, stette lungo tempo senza 
metter il piè fuori della camera, temendo che i polli non corressero a dargli del becco e inghiottirlo.” 
114 Guazzo, S., La civil conversatione, ed. Quondam,  vol. I, 18-19, 26-9. 
115 I am not suggesting a relationship of influence between these texts: there is no reason to think that 
Nicolaus  had  been  read  by  Guazzo  or  Burton,  and  although  Burton  had  read  Guazzo  (he  refers  to 
Salmuth’s Latin translation of 1614 at in Burton, R., Anatomy, vol. I, 329 and vol. III, 2, 324), there is no 
sign  that  Burton’s  consolatio  was  substantially  influenced  by  La  civil  conversatione.    Rather,  the  common 
features in these works stem from the broader constellation of concepts and themes that I have been 
outlining throughout this essay. 
116 Burton, R., Anatomy, 1.1.2.7, vol. I, 152; 1.1.2.10, vol. I, 158-9. 
117 Burton, R., Anatomy, 1.1.3.2, vol. I, 163-5. I discuss Ercole’s theory of melancholy in “Melancholy and 
Dreaming in Renaissance Learning”, in Diseases of the Imagination in Early Modern Europe, ed. Y. Haskell 
(Turnhout: Brepols, 2012), 53-102, at 61-5. 
118 Burton, R., Anatomy, 1.1.3.1, vol. I, 161; 1.1.3.3, vol. I, 166-8. 
119 Burton, R., Anatomy, 1.2.3.1, vol. I, 246-301. See, generally, Gowland, A., (2006b), 124-7. 
120 Principally—as he makes clear in numerous places—Plato’s Charmides 156D-E, according to which “all 
the mischiefes of the Body, proceed from the Soule” (Burton, R., Anatomy, 1.2.3.1, vol. I, 247, also cited in 
vol. II, 100, 109, vol. III, 49, 75. Bamborough suggests that Burton took the quotation in 1.2.3.1 from 
Mercuriale’s Liber responsorum et consultationum medicinalium (Basle, 1588), VI, 36-7, but this passage in the 
Charmides is frequently cited in other medical works used by Burton, such as the De morbis melancholicis by 
André du Laurens: Discourse, 107. Cf. also the citation of the Timaeus in Mercuriale, G., Medicina practica, seu 
de cognoscendis, discernendis, & curandis omnibus humani corpris affectibus, earumque causis indagandis, libri V (Lyon, 
1617), I.1, 1-2. 
121 Burton, R., Anatomy, 1.2.3.1, vol. I, 247-8. 
122 His acknowledged sources here are Heinrich Cornelius Agrippa’s De occulta philosophia libri tres (1533), 
Girolamo  Cardano’s  De  subtilitate  rerum  (1550),  Levinus  Lemnius’s  De  miraculis  occultis  naturae  (1559, 
expanded in 1574), Francisco Suárez’s Metaphysicae disputationes (1597), Timothie Bright’s Treatise of Melancholy 
(1586), and Thomas Wright’s Passions of the Minde (1601). 
123 Burton, R., Anatomy, 1.1.2.7, vol. I, 152. 
124 Burton, R., Anatomy, 1.2.3.1, vol. I, 248-9. 
125 For a survey see Thorndike, L., “Imagination and Magic: The Force of Imagination on the Human Body 
and of Magic on the Human Mind”, in Mélanges Eugène Tisserant, 7 (Vatican City: Bibliotheca Vaticana, 
1964). 
126 Burton, R., Anatomy, 1.2.3.2, vol. I, 250, where the qualification “in some parties” was added in the 
edition of 1628. 
127 Burton, R., Anatomy, 1.2.3.2, vol. I, 250-1. 
128 Burton, R., Anatomy, 1.2.3.2, vol. I, 253-4, referring to De incantationibus (1520), IV. 
129 Burton, R., Anatomy, 1.2.3.2, vol. I, 254. Cf. the guarded scepticism concerning the therapeutic power of 
imagination in Bacon, The Advancement of Learning, II, in SEH III, 369. 
130 Burton, R., Anatomy, 2.3.6.1, vol. II, 187. 
131 Burton, R., Anatomy, 1.1.3.2, vol. I, 164-5. 
132 For example, in Capo di Vacca, G., Practica medicina (Frankfurt, 1594), I.10, 94. 
133 Burton, R., Anatomy, 2.2.6.1-2.2.64, vol. II, 99-124, and the many medical sources cited there. On the 
therapeutic employment of manipulative psychological measures see Schleiner, W., “Ethical Problems of 
the  Lie  that  Heals  in  Renaissance  Literature”,  in  Eros  and  Anteros:  The  Medical  Traditions  of  Love  in  the 
Renaissance, eds. D. A. Beecher and M. Ciavolella (Toronto, 1992). 
134 Burton, R., Anatomy, 1.2.3.2, vol. I, 255. 
135 Burton, R., Anatomy, 2.2.6.1, vol. II, 101, quoting from his copy of Piso, N., De cognoscendis et curandis 
praecipue  internis  humani  corporis  morbis  libri  tres  I.23  (Frankfurt,  1585),  180-1.  According  to  F.  F.  Blok,  
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commenting on the correspondence of the melancholic Dutch humanist Caspar Barlaeus, reason, “cannot 
… be brought to bear’ upon a disease in which ‘rational thought is dominated and eliminated by the 
corrupt imagination” (Blok, F.F., Caspar Barlaeus: From the Correspondence of a Melancholic (Assen, 1976), 35-6). 
Pace Blok, when in March 1632 Petrus Cunaeus told his friend Barlaeus that his condition “can be cured by 
rational deliberation”, this was perfectly consonant with the learned medical understanding of the disease, 
at least in its milder forms (Blok, Caspar Barlaeus, 38-9, letter of March 9, 1632); see also the emphasis on 
melancholy as a depravation of imagination but not rational understanding in Cunaeus’s letter sent in June 
1632, at 49. 
136 Burton, R., Anatomy, 2.2.6.1, 101-2. 
137 Burton’s reference here is to Seneca’s De ira II.12.3-4, on the necessity of mental disciplina. 
138 Burton, R., Anatomy, 1.1.2.9, 1.1.2.11, vol. I, 157, 159. After the Fall, however, the will is “many times 
rebellious in us” does not always obey reason: 1.1.2.11, vol. I, 160-1. 
139 Burton, R., Anatomy, 1.1.2.8, vol. I, 153-4. 
140 Burton, R., Anatomy, 2.2.6.1, vol. II, 104. For Burton’s account of the moving faculty see Burton, R., 
Anatomy, 1.1.2.8, vol. I, 153-4. 
141 Burton, R., Anatomy, 2.2.6.1, vol. II, 104. 
142  Before  proceeding  to  the  consolation  proper,  however,  Burton  does  discuss  a  range  of  pragmatic 
psychological therapies, including deception to dispel hallucinations, cheerful company, and music: Burton, 
R., Anatomy, 2.2.6.2-4, vol. II, 106-24. For a summary see Jackson, S., “Robert Burton and Psychological 
Healing”, Journal of the History of Medicine and Allied Sciences 44 (1989): 160-78.  
143 Burton, R., Anatomy, 2.2.6.2, vol. II, 106, quoting Alexander of Tralles (“If our imaginations be not inveterate, 
by this art they may bee cured, especially, if they proceed from such a cause”). 
144 Burton, R., Anatomy, 2.2.6.2, vol. II, 109. 
145 Burton, R., Anatomy, 2.2.6.2, vol. II, 110. 
146 Burton, R., Anatomy, 2.3.1.1, vol. II, 125. Burton also suggested that his book could work as a self-
consolation (Anatomy, ‘Democritus Junior to the Reader’, vol. I, 6-8; for some parallels with Montaigne here 
see Les Essais, eds. J. Balsamo, M. Magnien, and C. Magnien-Simonin (Paris: Gallimard, 2007), II.8, 404,  
II.12, 512, but see also I.24, 143. Elsewhere, Montaigne was ambiguous about philosophical consolation: 
III.4, 871-5,  III.12, 1098. 
147 Burton, R., Anatomy, 2..3.2.1-2.3.7.1, vol. II, 132-206. 
148 Burton, R, Anatomy, “Democritus Junior to the Reader”, vol. I, p. 22. 
149 See Gowland, A., (2006b), 266-87. 
150 For a concise summary of its contents, see Lievsay, J.L., “Robert Burton’s De consolatione”, South Atlantic 
Quarterly 55 (1951): 329-36. 
151 Burton, R., Anatomy 2.3.3.1, vol. II, 166. 
152 Burton, R., Anatomy, 2.3.6.1, vol. II, 195. 
153 Burton, R., Anatomy, 2.3.6.1, vol. II, 187. 
154 Burton, R., Anatomy, 2.3.3.1, vol. II, 155. 
155 Burton, R., Anatomy, 2.3.3.1, vol. II, 156. 
156 Such as that “thou alone art unhappy, none so bad as thy selfe”, that bodily sickness or poverty are 
lamentable evils: Burton, R., Anatomy, 2.3.1.1-2, vol. II, 129, 132-6, 144-73. 
157  We  should  note  that  the  full  title  of  the  digression  is  “A  Consolatory  Digression,  containing  the 
Remedies of all manner of Discontents”, and that Burton suggests that it could also benefit those who are 
not suffering from melancholy (Burton, R., Anatomy, 2.3.1.1, vol. II, 125); in this sense, it is not just a 
consolation for melancholy and its attendant passions. 
158 Burton, R., Anatomy, 2.3.3.1, vol. II, 169-71. 
159 Burton includes Epictetus in his list of canonical consolatory writers (Anatomy, 2.3.1.1, vol. I, 125), and 
refers to him at several points in the digression: 134, 149-50, 153, 158, 166, 169, 184, 186. 
160 Burton, R., Anatomy, 2.3.8.1, vol. II, 206. 
161 Burton, R., Anatomy, 1.4.1.1, vol. I, 428-9: “If this malady be not hereditary, and taken at the beginning 
there is good hope of cure ….  [but] if it be inveterate, it is incurable, a common axiome, aut difficulter 
curabilis … hardly cured.” 
162 Burton, R., Anatomy, 1.4.1.1, vol. I, 430-4; vol. III, 199.  
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163 See, for example, Burton, R., Anatomy, 1.3.1.2, vol. I, 390-2. 
164 Burton, R., Anatomy, 2.3.8.2, 206-7. 
165 For example, Burton, R., Anatomy, 1.4.1.1, vol. I, 433. 
166 For example, in Cardano, G., De consolatione, 636b. 
167 Scala, B., Dialogus de consolatione, XLIV, 130-33. The source of Cosimo’s anecdote about Hegesias is 
Cicero, Tusculanae disputationes I.116. 
168 Scala, B., Dialogus de consolatione, XXXI, 113. 
169 Scala, B., Dialogus de consolatione, XLVIII, 139. Cardano similarly acknowledges that his detailed depiction 
of human vacuity is likely to increase rather than decrease the sadness of his readers: Cardano, G., De 
consolatione, II, 596b: “Sed dum aliorum inanes has ineptias describo, iam naeniam quandam confecisse 
videor: soloque nomine tristem luctum, non tantum descripsisse, sed auxisse.” [= “But while I set forth the 
follies of others, me thincke I have framed a mourninge dittye: and have not only described, but rather 
encreased heavye mourning” (Cardanus comforte, fol. C.i.r-v)]. 
170 Burton, R., Anatomy, 2.3.1.1, vol. II, 127 et sqq. 
171 Burton, R., Anatomy, 2.3.1.1, vol. II, 125. Of course, those who are in distress might draw solace from 
such observations: “comfort thye selfe with other mens misfortunes”: Burton, R., Anatomy, 2.3.1.1, vol. II, 
130. 
172 Burton, R., Anatomy, vol. I, 24; see also 1.3.1.2, vol. I, 387. 
173 Nietzsche, F., The Birth of Tragedy, §3, in The Birth of Tragedy and Other Writings, ed. R. Geuss and R. Speirs 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 23. 
174 Scala, B., Dialogus de consolatione, XLV, 135. 
175 Scala, B., Dialogus de consolatione, XLV, 135 and XLVII, 137. 
176 Scala, B., Dialogus de consolatione, LXII, 129. 
177 Scala, B., Dialogus de consolatione, LXVII, 137-9. 
178 Scala, B., Dialogus de consolatione, LXIX, 139-41. 
179 Burton, R., Anatomy, 2.3.5.1, vol. II, 178. He is quoting Bernard of Clairvaux. 
180 Burton, R., Anatomy, 2.3.8.1, vol. II, 207. 
181 See Burton, R., Anatomy, “Democritus Junior to the Reader”, vol. I, 24-32, 37-85, 97-113. The role of 
Erasmian paradoxy in Burton’s work is explored in Colie, R., Paradoxia Epidemica: The Renaissance Tradition of 
Paradox (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1966), 430-60; see also Colie, R.,  “Some Notes on 
Burton’s Erasmus”, Renaissance Quarterly 20 (1967): 335-41. Burton’s immediate source for the idea that it is 
“better to be foolish and quiet, quam sapere & ringi, to be wise and still vexed”, is the satirical Menippus, sive 
Dialogorum satyricorum centuria inanitatum nostratium speculum (1618) by the German theologian and hermetic 
philosopher Johann Valentin Andreae. He has however referred to Erasmus on the previous page: Burton, 
R., Anatomy, 2.3.8.1, vol. II, 206. 
182 Burton, R., Anatomy, 2.3.4.1, 172-3. 
183 Burton, R., Anatomy, 2.3.8.1, 207. 
184 I would like to thank an anonymous reader for their helpful and interesting comments on an earlier 
version of this essay. 